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The Origins of Classes of Projective Content 
“Projection” can be understood as a linguistic phenomenon in which content implied in a 
sentence persists even when we negate the sentence. Much of the discussion of projective 
content has centered on presupposition, but focusing only on presupposition would exclude 
many implications that do project but typically have not been understood as a type of 
presupposition (Simons et al., 2011). Tonhauser et al. (2013) presents a taxonomy of projective 
contents that groups the implications into four distinct classes. The taxonomy divides the 
projective contents along two axes, depending on whether the contents impose a Strong 
Contextual Felicity Constraint (SCFC) or whether they have an Obligatory Local Effect (OLE). 
While the authors provide diagnostics to determine which contents impose the SCFC or have an 
OLE, they do not offer a reason why particular projective contents are associated with particular 
phenomena. In this paper, I will offer an account of why projective contents belong to the class 
of contents that they do. 
Simons et al. (2011) discusses projection and provides a way of understanding why 
contents project. The authors define projection as an implication that persists under an 
entailment-cancelling operator. The sentence in (1a) carries at least two implications; the first is 
that Archie used to eat meat, and the second is that Archie no longer eats meat.  
(1a). Archie stopped eating meat. 
The implication that Archie does not eat meat is the entailment of sentence (1a), but sentences 
(1b) and (1c) do not carry this entailment. 
(1b). Archie did not stop eating meat. 
(1c). Did Archie stop eating meat? 
This means that negating the sentence and questioning the sentence put (1a) under an entailment-
cancelling operator.  Asserting that Archie has not stopped eating meat clearly does not entail 
that Archie does not eat meat –it entails the opposite – but it still does imply that Archie used to 
eat meat. Asking whether Archie has stopped eating meat entails neither that Archie does not eat 
meat nor the opposite, but it too carries the implication that Archie used to eat meat. This shows 
that there is at least one implication that persists in both of these cases.  
 The same authors present a similar understanding of projection in Tonhauser et al. 
(2013). There, they develop a diagnostic for determining whether an implication projects. If a 
trigger imposes an SCFC (something that I will cover in detail later), then it is projective. If it 
does not impose an SCFC, then we can determine if an implication projects based on the “family 
of sentences” diagnostic. Roughly, a content that does not impose an SCFC is projective when it 
is implied when a sentence containing a trigger for that projection is asserted, negated, asked as a 
question, used as the antecedent of a conditional (1d), or when used in an epistemic modal (1e) 
(Simons et al. 2011).  
 (1d). If Archie stopped eating meat, then he will probably order the salad. 
 (1e). It is possible that Archie stopped eating meat. 
Simons et al. (2011) gives an account of projection that bases the phenomenon on what is 
at-issue in discourse. The authors point out that projections are separate from the main point of 
the utterance; instead, they argue, projections seem to be something that a speaker takes for 
granted in uttering a sentence. Sentential operators – such as negation, conditionals, and modals 
– are limited in scope to the main point of the sentence, and therefore, would have no effect on 
projective content. By “at-issue,” the authors mean that something is at-issue with regard to a 
“Question Under Discussion” (QUD). The QUD is a question that corresponds to the topic of 
discourse, which interlocutors address in different ways with many potential methods throughout 
a given conversation. The authors’ hypothesis about “what projects and why” is that all 
implications that are not at issue relative to the QUD can project. This is the case because 
operators target only at issue-content, meaning that they will have no effect on projections.  
 The categorization of projective contents is the focus of Tonhauser et al. (2013). The 
authors divide the different sorts of projective contents along two axes. These are the “Strong 
Contextual Felicity Constraint” and the “Obligatory Local Effect.” In the authors’ terms, the 
SCFC involves an utterance’s acceptability in an “m-neutral” context, where m-neutral context is 
a context that implies neither a projective content nor its negation. If a sentence containing a 
trigger of the projective content, m, is acceptable in an m-neutral context, then the projection 
does not impose an SCFC. If a sentence containing a trigger of m is unacceptable in an m-neutral 
context, but acceptable in an m-positive context (one in which the projection, m, is implied), then 
the projection imposes an SCFC. For example, in a context that does not imply that there is some 
salient person being discussed, it would be infelicitous to use an utterance containing a pronoun, 
because the referent of the pronoun would only be clear in the speaker’s mind, but not in the 
context of discourse. This implies that something like a pronoun triggers a projection that 
imposes an SCFC. 
 The Obligatory Local Effect concerns projective content embedded under a belief 
predicate. When a sentence containing a trigger of a projection, m, is the complement of a belief 
predicate, m has an OLE if and only if m is necessarily a part of the content that is believed. We 
can understand a projective trigger to have an OLE when belief in the projection is necessarily 
attributed to the belief-holder. For example, it would be wrong to say that I believe that it has 
stopped raining, but also that it was not raining. This implies that “stop” triggers some sort of 
projection that has an Obligatory Local Effect. The authors provide an in-depth diagnostic for 
OLE covering five different scenarios, which for the purposes of this paper, it will not be 
necessary to reproduce.  
Although Tonhauser et al. (2013) do not use this terminology, we can also understand the 
SCFC in terms of common ground. A roughly equivalent way of characterizing the SCFC is to 
say that something imposes an SCFC when a felicitous utterance of a projective content trigger 
requires that the projection be a part of the interlocutors’ common ground. 
Common ground can be understood as interlocutors’ mutual recognition of what is 
commonly believed. In order for some Φ to be common ground, interlocutors must believe Φ 
and believe that all other members believe Φ and believe that all other members believe that all 
other members believe Φ and so on. This preliminary understanding, however, is somewhat 
inadequate. Stalnaker (2002) discusses common ground and through this discussion, shows why 
a characterization of common ground as being based on common belief must be refined and 
expanded upon. He criticizes the idea that common ground should be based upon beliefs, and 
this this comes about through his discussion of the phenomenon known as accommodation. 
Accommodation is a fairly intuitive and commonplace phenomenon. If a person were to 
tell a stranger that she must meet her brother for lunch, the stranger would likely come to believe 
that the person has a brother. This, however, was not asserted by the person, but was merely 
presupposed. A speaker can use an assertion to add to the common ground in a clear way – by 
making some fact known and expecting that his or her interlocutor will accept it. 
Presuppositions, however, do not function this way. Since presuppositions seem to involve what 
a speaker takes for granted in an utterance, felicitous use of a presupposition-containing sentence 
should require that this presupposition already be in the common ground. This does not match 
our intuitions, since it seems perfectly natural that someone could mention to a stranger that she 
must meet her brother, even when it is clear that the stranger could not know beforehand that the 
person had a brother. Accommodation is what fixes this problem. With accommodation, the 
presupposition is added to the common ground at the time of utterance. According to Stalnaker 
(2002), this can occur because of the common belief that a person would not purposefully be 
dishonest. It is reasonable, then, for a person to believe that her interlocutor would come to 
believe that she has a brother. Since the person believes that she has a brother and believes that 
their interlocutor will come to believe this, and since the interlocutor does indeed come to 
believe the presupposition, it can be considered a common belief and therefore, part of the 
common ground. 
Accommodation, however, is not simply limited to beliefs. Stalnaker (2002) points to 
some examples that show that this is the case and use these to expand the notion of common 
ground beyond simply common belief. He discusses how accommodation and beliefs can 
diverge in the case of “defective contexts,” or contexts in which not all beliefs about the common 
ground are correct. A defective context can become clear when a speaker makes an utterance that 
indicates that he or she thinks that it is a common belief that something is true, but when the 
listener does not believe that this presupposition is true. A speaker might point out “the man 
drinking a martini,” and the listener might accept this, even when he knows the liquid to be 
water. Stalnaker (2002) argues, then, that rather than belief, we should characterize 
accommodation and common ground in terms of “acceptance.” He characterizes acceptance as 
an attitude toward a proposition that includes belief, presumption, or assuming something for the 
sake of argument.  
The definition of common ground with which Stalnaker (2002) concludes is that “it is 
common ground that Φ in a group if all members accept (for the purpose of the conversation) 
that Φ, and all believe that all accept that Φ, and all believe that all believe that all accept that Φ, 
etc.” (716).  
With this, we can understand accommodation as being less about updating and accepting 
shared beliefs. Instead, it is a way to keep a conversation moving forward. When a 
presupposition is accommodated, it is because the listener sees no reason to object, whether it be 
because they have come to have a new belief or because they find a presupposition 
unobjectionable enough to grant it to the speaker in order to keep the conversation flowing. The 
common ground, rather than being about mutual alignment of shared beliefs, is the set of 
assumptions that speakers judge to be relatively unobjectionable. 
 Tonhauser et al. (2013) does not study pragmatics and common ground in general, but 
instead focuses on projection specifically in Guarani and English. The research on projective 
content in the South American language, Guarani, and its comparison to the completely 
unrelated English language provides one of the most important aspects of the analysis of 
projection in Tonhauser et al. (2013), since it allows the authors to suggest that the taxonomy of 
projective content that they present is universal. 
The authors presented sentences with projective content in different contexts to native 
speakers of Guarani. Based on both the responses of the Guarani speakers and the authors’ native 
English-speaking intuitions, they determined that projective content functions the same way in 
both Guarani and English. The same contents project, and each projection has the same features 
in both languages, e.g. the polar implications of almost and aimete (Guarani for almost) do not 
impose the SCFC and have an OLE in both languages. The only differences between Guarani 
and English with regard to projection arise due to non-pragmatic linguistic differences. For 
example, there is a gender-attribution projection associated with third-person singular pronouns 
in English, but the Guarani third-person singular pronoun does not mark gender. The fact that, 
where applicable, projection functions the same way in the two unrelated languages suggests that 
projection and features associated with particular projective contents are universal. This could 
mean that projection is based on some common feature of language, discourse, or human 
cognition. In this paper, I will attempt to determine what universal rules of discourse might lead 
to the SCFC and OLE.  
 One of the classes of projective content in Tonhauser et al. (2013) imposes the SCFC, but 
does not have the OLE. The authors label this “Class D Projective Content” and claim that this 
class of projective content has been previously unrecognized. The projections included in Class 
D are salience conditions for triggers such as “too.” This projection implies that there is a salient 
referent to the word “too.” In order for a felicitous utterance of a sentence such as (2), there must 
be at least one person other than Matthew driving his or her car.  
(2). Matthew is driving his car too. 
This existence projection, however, is not enough. If someone were to ask me what Matthew is 
doing, and I responded with (2), this would be infelicitous. Surely, at least one other person in 
the world is driving his or her car, but this is not enough to make the sentence acceptable. There 
must also be a salient referent of “too” that the listener can identify in order for a felicitous 
utterance of (2). 
 Other examples of Class D projective content are the salience projection associated with 
“that (Noun),” and although not included in the original taxonomy, the salience projection 
associated with pronouns. That there is a salience projection associated with pronouns that 
belongs to Class D can be demonstrated using the diagnostic presented in Tonhauser et al. 
(2013). The salience implication of a sentence in (3a) has strong contextual felicity because 
uttering it is unacceptable in a context where neither the identifiability nor non-identifiability of 
the referent are implied.  
(3a). She talks too fast. 
(3b). George believes she talks too fast. 
Uttering (3a) unexpectedly, when it is not clear that there is a relevant “she” that is being 
referenced, would, according to Tonhauser et al. (2013), form an m-neutral context since the 
speaker fails to make the reference clear. Since (3a) is unacceptable in this context, but would 
acceptable in a context where the speaker can easily identify the referent (m-positive), then, 
according to the diagnostic, it is also projective. If we take (3a) and embed it under a belief-
predicate, then we get a sentence like (3b). The sentence in (3b) is acceptable when “she” has an 
identifiable discourse referent but George is not aware of this. Let us say that in this case, Maria 
is the referent of “she.” George need not know that Maria is a salient referent in John and 
Michael’s conversation in order for it to be acceptable that Michael utters (3b). This indicates 
that the salience projection of pronouns does not have an OLE, and thus belongs to the class of 
projective contents called Class D in Tonhauser et al. (2013).  
 It is important to note that the other class of projective contents that impose the Strong 
Contextual Felicity Constraint, Class A, contains the same triggers as Class D. Rather than 
projecting a salience condition, Class A triggers project an existence condition. For example, 
there are at least two projections associated with a pronoun. The first is that the referent is salient 
and this projection belongs to Class D, while the other is that the referent exists and this belongs 
to Class A. 
 At this point, it would be appropriate to discuss the classification of projective contents 
associated with possessive noun phrases and definite descriptions. The classification of the 
projections triggered by these phrases will be crucial to my discussion of the SCFC.  
 The possessive noun phrase projects a possessive relation presupposition. By referring to 
an object as “my x,” I presuppose my possession of the object. Tonhauser et al. (2013) analyze 
this projection in both Guarani and English and show that it does not have an SCFC and does not 
impose an OLE. This places the projection within “Class B.” 
 The possessive noun phrase should also project an existence presupposition. As discussed 
earlier, in order to utter felicitously a sentence like, “I have to pick up my sister,” the existence of 
my sister must already be in the common ground. These presuppositions, however, are readily 
accommodated. Upon utterance, the existence of my sister will be added to the common ground 
unless my interlocutor has some strong reason to find this presupposition objectionable.  
 This is also the case for definite descriptions. In order to assert that “the King of France is 
bald,” the existence of the King of France must be common ground. This is another example of 
readily and easily accommodated projective content. If a listener knows very little about the 
French political system or finds that my false belief is not too objectionable for the purposes of 
conversation, then the existence of the King of France will become common ground. 
 In order to determine whether these projections have a Strong Contextual Felicity 
constraint, we must examine these projections while taking their ease of accommodation into 
account. The SCFC involves acceptability in a context that neither implies the projection nor its 
opposite. If something does not have an SCFC, it is appropriate to utter it when the context does 
not imply it or when it is not in the common ground. If accommodation did not occur, then 
existence projections triggered by phrases like possessive noun phrases and definite descriptions 
would have an SCFC, since they do require their presuppositions be in the common ground. 
Since, however, the existence presuppositions are so easily accommodated, they are appropriate 
in an m-neutral context. Tonhauser et al. (2013) seem to agree that existence projections of 
possessive noun phrases and definite descriptions do not have strong contextual felicity. 
Although the authors do not classify these projections, they do mention that projections that 
impose an SCFC have strong constraints on context that cannot be satisfied by accommodation 
and that those projections that do not have an SCFC might either have a weak constraint on 
context that can be satisfied through accommodation or could have no contextual constraint 
whatsoever. 
 These projections, like all other projections concerning existence, do have an Obligatory 
Local Effect. The fact that sentences like (4) are contradictory demonstrates this. 
(4). #Jones believes the King of France is bald, but that he does not exist. 
If Jones has a belief about the King of France, then we necessarily attribute to Jones the belief in 
the existence of the King of France. 
 Since the existence projections triggered by possessive noun phrases and definite 
descriptions do not impose an SCFC and do not have an OLE, we can put them in the class of 
projective content called “Class C” in Tonhauser et al. (2013). If accommodation did not occur, 
they would impose an SCFC and would be grouped in “Class A” along with the existence 
projections associated with pronouns or the word “too.” 
 If we were to take the everyday English sentences that give rise to Class A and D 
projective contents and change them so that they are no longer indexical (for example, replacing 
all pronouns with the nouns to which they refer), we would no longer have Class A or D 
projective contents. A sentence such as 5a would simply become 5b. 
(5a). She plays the saxophone. 
(5b). My sister plays the saxophone. 
Class D contents, which rely on identifiability or salience, would not exist in these situations, 
because identifiability would no longer be relevant. Whereas felicitous use of “she” involves a 
demonstrative “pointing-to” an identifiable discourse-referent, uttering “my sister” does not. In 
these cases, Class A content would not exist simply because they would be the same as Class C 
contents, e.g. the projection that “she” exists would become the projection that “my sister” exists. 
What is significant here is that the existence projection associated with “she” imposes a Strong 
Contextual Felicity Constraint, but the existence projection of “my sister” does not. Since Class 
D contents go away and Class A contents become Class C, doing away with the need for 
referents to be identifiable does away with the SCFC. This suggests a link between the Strong 
Contextual Felicity Constraint and identifiability that I will investigate here.  
 Since, as discussed earlier, imposing an SCFC corresponds to an inability to be 
accommodated, a good way to approach an analysis of the SCFC is to work out the relationship 
between identifiability and accommodation.  
Accommodation occurs when a hearer does not take issue with a projection. They accept 
this projection for the purposes of conversation. Accommodation can occur when our belief 
toward a projective content is neutral or when we disbelieve the projection and are willing to 
grant it to the speaker. If, when talking to a close friend, he says to me the sentence in (6), I will 
not question the existence of his brother. 
  (6). I am meeting my brother for lunch. 
If I know that this friend has a brother, then we are in agreement and there is no need for 
accommodation. I take this projection for granted just as much as the speaker does. If I am 
thoroughly convinced that the speaker does not have a brother, then accommodation likely will 
not occur. The speaker and I are in disagreement, and I might ask the speaker what exactly he or 
she means, or I could interpret this as a non-standard use of the word “brother,” or I might worry 
about the speaker’s mental health. I will not begin simply to believe that the speaker has a 
brother.  
There are, however, cases in which I can accommodate a projection despite believing its 
opposite. If I think that the speaker was an only child, but do not know him well, I will assume 
that I am mistaken, and as a result, I will update my belief. Accommodation here will occur 
based on some subjective measure of how convinced I am of my belief in the opposite of the 
projection and my trust in the speaker. This is pretty clearly something that varies person-to-
person. A more trusting and timid person will likely accommodate information they disbelieve 
more readily than others will. 
Cases in which I have no belief one way or another in the truth or falsehood of a 
projection are likely cases where accommodation is most likely. This state of mind roughly 
corresponds to the m-neutral context used in the SCFC in Tonhauser et al. (2013). If I meet a 
stranger on the street, and he says that he has to meet his brother for lunch, I will easily 
accommodate this information and come to believe that the speaker has a brother. 
Since imposing an SCFC is approximately the same as an inability to be accommodated, 
projections with an SCFC are projections where we will always be unwilling to grant the 
projected content to the speaker; however, there must be some reason as to why listeners do not 
accommodate Class A and D projective contents. My claim is that the triggers that cause Class A 
and D projective contents never project something that a listener is able to accommodate, since 
they necessarily imply something that a speaker simply cannot accept for the purposes of 
conversation. Salience illustrates this phenomenon.  
  One way in which accommodation can occur is through adding common beliefs to the 
common ground, but the salience or identifiability projections associated with Class D content 
imply something about which a listener cannot be neutral. Since a listener necessarily does have 
a definite belief as to whether he or she can identify a salient discourse referent, the listener must 
either agree or disagree with the speaker. The speaker believes that the listener can identify a 
referent. Either the listener can identify the referent, in which case, they believe that they can 
identify the referent, and are in agreement with the speaker, or they cannot identify the referent, 
believe that they cannot identify the referent, and are in disagreement with the speaker. This 
leaves no room for accommodation through updating beliefs, since there is no neutral state (m-
neutral context) in which the listener is not sure that they can identify a referent; there is only 
total agreement or total disagreement.   
Updating beliefs, however, is not the only way that accommodation occurs; other forms 
of “acceptance” can cause accommodation. In these cases, the speaker appears to accept a 
presupposition in order to keep the discourse moving forward. In uttering a sentence containing a 
pronoun, a speaker takes for granted that the listener can identify the referent of this pronoun. 
Not only is this something that a listener cannot be neutral about, it is also not something that the 
listener will not object to for the sake of conversation, because failing to object would hinder 
conversation. If I think that a listener does not have a brother, I might not take issue with the 
projected existence of the brother so that I do not disrupt conversation, but when the 
presupposition is that I can identify a referent, conversation will fail if I cannot identify that 
referent. If two interlocutors are unclear about the referent of their conversation, they are not 
clear about the topic of discourse. These projections will not be accommodated, because failing 
to make an anaphoric referent identifiable is always objectionable. Accommodation occurs so 
that we can continue moving a conversation forward, but such a presupposition failure on the 
part of the speaker will cause miscommunication, meaning that accommodating the projection 
will be more detrimental to discourse than will granting the identifiability to the speaker.  
Stalnaker (2002) makes a similar point. He argues that that accommodation is impossible 
in defective contexts in which a speaker fails to make a reference clear. This is the case because 
of the expectation that speakers obeying a cooperative principle of communication will assume 
that all information needed to interpret their utterances is available to the listener. The speaker, in 
uttering a Class D projective trigger in a situation in which the speaker is unable to identify the 
anaphoric referent, has both failed at proper communication and has made some improper 
assumption about my mental state. The speaker, therefore, is being uncooperative. Unlike other 
cases on uncooperativity, such as lying or deceiving, the listener will not (and likely cannot) 
mistakenly believe that the speaker is being cooperative. A listener cannot be deceived into 
identifying an anaphoric referent. 
If it is indeed the case that the SCFC occurs because triggers associated with Class A and 
D contents fail to put the listener in an m-neutral context, we would expect that in a scenario 
where a listener is neutral as to whether they are able to identify a referent, they would 
accommodate Class A and D projections. These situations might be unlikely or even impossible, 
but I think there are certain scenarios where they could occur, or at least, there are certain 
scenarios that closely approximate such a situation. Take, for example, the story presented in 
example (7). 
(7). Bella is at a gathering and must pretend to be her identical twin sister, Claire. Claire 
does not wear glasses, but Bella does, and she is nearly blind without them. Bella goes to 
the gathering without her glasses in order to look more like her sister. A guest at the 
gathering comes up to Bella and says, “He is very tall.” Bella is not able to see the person 
that the guest is talking about, but in order not to blow her cover, she says, “Indeed, he 
is.” 
In (7) Bella puts herself into a situation in which she is not sure whether she should be 
able to identify something referenced in the visual field, because she is pretending to be Claire 
and is not sure whether Claire would be able to identify the referent in this situation. In this case, 
she accommodates that she should be able to identify the referent of the word “he.” It is difficult 
to say whether she accommodates the existence (Class A) projection associated with the 
pronoun, as believing that a referent is identifiable coincides with believing that a referent exists. 
In this scenario, it seems as if the primary focus is on the identifiability, rather than the existence. 
Even if Bella does not necessarily believe that she can identify the referent, at the very least, she 
plays along, but unless she is very untrusting, she will likely believe that she ought to be able to 
identify the anaphoric referent.  
Accommodation can occur in (7), because of Bella’s assumptions about the speaker. It is 
not common ground that the referent is identifiable in this case. Bella, however, assumes that her 
interlocutor will not be dishonest on purpose. Bella has no reason to believe that the man would 
approach her and utter the sentence if the referent were not seemingly identifiable. She therefore 
finds it unobjectionable that she ought to be able to identify the referent. That the referent of “he” 
is identifiable becomes accommodated. 
These scenarios may not necessarily be as strange as the previous example makes them 
seem. The example in (8) presents a much more commonplace scenario, and here, it seems as if 
the Class A existence projection of the pronoun can be accommodated. The previous example 
tries to construct a case in which the listener is unsure whether she can identify the referent, but 
in a more natural scenario, a listener might accommodate a Class A projection through simply 
granting to the speaker that the referent exists, and making some small adjustment in order to 
better be able to identify it. In this way, we can come up with a scenario in which the listener 
does seem to accommodate existence conditions of a pronoun.  
(8). Archie and Bella are walking down the street and a very tall man is directly ahead of 
them. Bella has taken off her glasses in order to wear her non-prescription sunglasses. 
Without corrective lenses, Bella is unable to see at far distances. Archie makes a gesture 
pointing forward and says, “He is very tall.” Bella switches to her prescription glasses, 
spots the man, and agrees with Archie. 
In (8), Bella is unsure whether there is any actual person to which Archie is referring. 
Archie may or may not know that Bella cannot identify the referent. If Bella thinks that Archie 
assumes that she can identify the referent, then this scenario might be somewhat similar to (7). If 
however, Bella thinks that Archie assumes that she is unable to identify the referent without 
switching her glasses, then the existence of the referent takes precedent. Although Bella has no 
way of knowing whether the referent exists (as she cannot even identify him), she will accept 
Archie’s presupposition that he exists. If Bella agreed with Archie that she could not currently 
identify anything, she would not bother switching her glasses if she did not accept that there was 
something out there for her to see. In a way, we can understand Bella’s switching to her regular 
glasses as evidence that she has accommodated the fact that there is a person out there, and she 
puts on her glasses in order to see him.  
It would be completely disruptive and unnatural for Bella to deny that the referent 
existed. If Bella accused Archie of lying, and said, “There is no one out there, you fool,” Archie 
would likely be offended and tell her to switch her glasses.  
This account of accommodation might pose some problems for the Strong Contextual 
Felicity Constraint as presented in Tonhauser et al. (2013). It seems that there might be cases in 
which the projections that should have an SCFC can be found to be acceptable in m-neutral 
contexts. On top of this, there seems to be a gray area in the existence projections of Class C and 
Class A existence presuppositions. As shown before, a definite description would belong in 
Class C. Pronouns, on the other hand, as well as demonstratives, are clearly within Class A. 
These determiner phrases seem to exist on a continuum from pronoun and demonstrative type 
phrases to more definite-description-like phrases. It becomes difficult to decide how exactly to 
classify phrases such as “the man,” “the man who is king,” “the king.” There seems here to be a 
continuum of contextual felicity. If we rank determiner phrases from those with stronger 
contextual felicity constraints to those with weaker contextual felicity constraints, it seems 
difficult to draw a clear line that separates these phrases into those that impose an SCFC and 
those that do not. 
If the Strong Contextual Felicity Constraint is caused by our inability to be neutral toward 
matters of salience, it is clear why the salience projections of Class D impose the constraint, but I 
have not yet explained why the existence projections in Class A impose the constraint. In order 
to account for this, I will focus particularly on one projective trigger. The “that (Noun)” trigger, 
as in the sentence in (9), projects at least three distinct projective contents. 
(9). That jerk talked on his phone the whole time. 
When a sentence such as (9) is subjected to the Family of Sentences Diagnostic, there are 
at least three implications that persist. The first is that this referent exists. The second is that the 
hearer should be able to identify the referent. The third is the property attribution – that the 
referent is a jerk. These contents are the existence of a referent, its salience, and property 
attribution, and the three contents belong to Class A, Class D, and Class B, respectively. What is 
significant here is that the property attribution Class B projection does not impose the Strong 
Contextual Felicity Constraint. This indexical trigger (which is dependent upon salience) projects 
at least one content that is appropriate in a neutral context and that can be accommodated. Since 
it is not necessary that indexical triggers impose the constraint, then in order for my account of 
this phenomenon to hold water, I need some way of describing why the existence projection of 
the “that (Noun)” trigger imposes the Strong Contextual Felicity Constraint while the property 
attribution projection does not.  
It is worth noting that the “that (Noun)” trigger behaves exactly like the pronoun. Both 
have a Class A existence projection and a Class D salience projection. Tonhauser et al. (2013) 
showed that the “that (Noun)” trigger has a Class B property attribution projection, but pronouns 
also carry property attributions. The pronoun, “she,” not only points at a thing in the world, it 
also implies that the referent is female. This property attribution can also be shown to belong to 
Class B. Consider the scenario in (10). 
(10). My brother is waiting for me at some predetermined location. As I approach, I can 
see him talking with someone, but he or she is so distant that I cannot make out any 
features of the person. By the time I get there, this person has left, so I ask my brother to 
whom he was speaking. He responds by saying, “She is an old friend.” 
The fact that the referent is a female projects – that the referent is female is not at issue. It also 
does not impose the SCFC because this is a neutral context – the context does not suggest either 
that the referent is a female or that the referent is not a female – and the utterance is still 
appropriate. We can also see that the property attribution projection of pronouns does not have 
an OLE, because the demonstrative use of “she” in a sentence such as (11) does not attribute 
contradictory beliefs to anyone. 
(11). My uncle believes that she is a man. 
We can think of pronouns as in some way being a way of saying “that (Noun).” “She” 
could be equivalent to saying, “that female.” It is conceivable that there could be a language 
where we must say “that female” when we mean “she,” and it is also conceivable that a language 
could have a pronoun meaning, “that jerk.” The following discussion of the three projections of 
the “that (Noun)” trigger should generalize to the three projections of pronouns. 
If a friend utters (12) without indicating a suitable referent, it is clearly infelicitous. I 
would be inclined to ask him whom he is referring, but I would never ask him what property he 
was attributing to this person. I still know that my friend believes that someone is a jerk, even if I 
do not know who that “someone” is. My understanding of the property attribution projection is in 
some way separate from my understanding of the salience projection. 
(12). That jerk stole my wallet. 
If my friend were to utter (12) without there being a salient referent, it would make sense 
for me to ask whether the referent existed. It is obviously a strange question since it could come 
off as impolite, but it does make sense to wonder whether a referent exists given that it cannot be 
identified. If I were a psychiatrist and a patient that suffers from paranoia and hallucinations 
utters the sentence in (12), it makes sense for me to question the existence of the referent. If I 
believe that the patient’s utterance stems from his paranoia, then I would question the salience 
condition – does he believe that the nurse stole his wallet? In this case, the referent would exist, 
but the patient would have failed to make the referent of “that” identifiable. If I believe it is a 
result of his hallucinations then I will question the existence condition – is he imagining some 
person that has stolen his wallet? In this case, the patient might very well believe that he is 
referencing a salient jerk standing right in front of him, but I cannot see this jerk because he or 
she does not exist. When the patient utters the sentence, I must ask myself whether he has failed 
to refer to something because he is referencing something that is not salient, or because he is 
referencing something that does not exist.  
This, then, might be a way to account for the Strong Contextual Felicity Constraint in 
Class A projective contents. The existence of a referent might be so intimately intertwined with 
the identifiability of the referent (in a way that property attribution is not) because an 
unidentifiable referent could be the result of either a referent that is not salient or a referent that 
does not exist. The property attribution projection, then, does not impose the SCFC because it is 
not linked to salience in such a way; if the referent does not have the property attributed to it, this 
does not make it impossible for the listener to identify the referent, although it could lead to 
confusions.   
Another possibility is that existence projections in Class A impose the Strong Contextual 
Felicity Constraint because they require that the listener first concerns herself with the salience 
of the referent before judging other features. In order to judge whether a referent exists, a listener 
must first understand what is being referenced. If “he” in the sentence, “He is bald,” refers to the 
King of France, the listener must first determine that “he” refers to the “King of France” before 
she can go out into the world and look for the existence of the King of France or before she can 
conjure up her knowledge of French government. In this case, the existence conditions would 
have an SCFC because they are determined by means of salience-dependent reference. Here, 
judging the existence of the referent depends on the listener’s ability to identify it. Since the 
ability to identify a referent is something that a listener cannot accommodate, the existence of the 
referent is something that the listener will not accommodate as well. The property attribution of 
“that (Noun)”, then, does not have an SCFC because the property attribution is not determined 
through the referential use of “that.” 
In order for this to be correct, there must be some reason as to why definite descriptions 
do not impose an SCFC. It could be the case that the descriptive content of a definite description 
is rich enough to make itself identifiable to the listener. Whereas a demonstrative functions 
somewhat like a gesture, pointing to its referent, the definite description refers because its 
content can be descriptive enough to make the referent clear to the listener. This would fit well 
with the “continuum” of contextual felicity mentioned earlier. Phrases with more descriptive 
content are less likely to impose an SCFC and more likely to belong to Class C, while less 
descriptive phrases that function more like demonstratives or even gestures are more likely to 
impose an SCFC and belong to Class A. 
A similar understanding of reference can be found in P.F. Strawson’s work. In Strawson 
(1959), he discusses demonstrative identification of particulars. Strawson (1959) describes 
demonstratives as words that directly locate the particulars being referred to. He argues that noun 
phrases such as “that car” are cases of demonstratives despite being helped by descriptive words. 
This demonstrative identification involves the triggers that give rise to Class A and D projective 
contents and they refer by, in a way, “pointing-to” its referent. Non-demonstrative identification, 
then, relies on descriptions, names, or both. Strawson (1959) points out that if a listener does not 
know of a particular object that fits a description, they may at that instant learn of such a 
particular. This demonstrates the ability of Class B and C projective contents to be 
accommodated.   
Yet another possible way to account for the SCFC in Class A contents is to suggest that 
existence projections impose the Strong Contextual Felicity Constraint because they are 
somehow “downstream” from the salience conditions, because existence is processed only after 
we process salience. This would imply that all projections downstream from the salience 
projection (if there are any other than existence) would also impose the Strong Contextual 
Felicity Constraint, and that any projections “upstream” from salience (i.e. processed before 
salience) would not impose the constraint. This could imply that the property attribution 
projection is upstream. First, we understand that the speaker is attributing a particular property 
attributed to something. Then, we understand that this thing with this property is something that 
we should be able to identify. Finally, we understand that this thing with this property should 
exist. 
If it is a matter of processing, this explanation should be empirically testable. One 
potential way of doing this would involve devising a response time test. In this, we could give 
someone a sentence similar to (12) and measure how quickly participants judge that the referent 
is a jerk, that the referent is identifiable, and that the referent exists. Another possible study is 
one in which we measure some sort of physiological response associated with surprise. In this 
experiment, we could give participants three scenarios in which the different projections are 
likely to cause surprise. We could have one case with a strange property attribution (“That 
ostrich-child stole my wallet!”), one in which the referent is not identifiable, and one in which 
the referent clearly does not exist. We could assume that a surprise response that takes longer to 
occur is processed later. 
 Up to this point, I have only discussed possible origins of the Strong Contextual Felicity 
Constraint, but this analysis would be incomplete without discussing the Obligatory Local Effect. 
What is the cause of the split between Class A and D contents and Class B and C contents? 
The OLE has to do with how projections behave when embedded in another person’s 
belief predicate. I will examine the causes of the OLE by contrasting Class A contents from 
Class D contents. Class A has an Obligatory Local Effect while Class D does not. The sentence 
in (13a) does not attribute contradictory beliefs to my mother, while (13b) does. 
 (13a). My mother believes that he is tall and does not know that we are talking about him. 
 (13b). #My mother believes that he is tall and that he does not exist. 
 I suggest that projections that have an OLE have it because it is necessary for a third 
person to believe that projection in order to have the belief that the speaker attributes to them. In 
this way, the conventional meaning of triggers for projections that have an OLE causes the OLE. 
For the sentence in (13b), my mother could not possibly believe that the referent of “he” is tall if 
she does not believe that he exists. 
 This works just as well for Class C contents. Class C existence projections work the same 
way as Class A existence projections – my mother must believe that the King of France exists in 
order to believe that he is bald. A similar reasoning can be used to explain projective content 
triggers such as “stop.” In order for my mother to believe that Archie stopped eating meat, she 
necessarily must believe that Archie used to eat meat; otherwise, she would simply believe that 
Archie does not eat meat. This necessity derives from the meaning of the word “stop.” It implies 
that a person used to do something; however, this implication is not at-issue, so it is a projective 
implication.  
 Contents that do not have OLE are contents for which it is not necessary for third person 
to hold in order to have a specific belief. Class B contents largely have to do with different 
names for an object and for different properties of that object.  It is not necessary that a person 
knows every name for or property of a thing in order to have a belief about it. For example, the 
possessive relation implication of a possessive noun phrase belongs to Class B. It is not 
necessary that a person knows that “my bike” in (14) is mine in order to have some belief about 
it – in fact they could hold the belief that my bike is theirs. Class D contents deal with context-
dependent identifiability. A third person does not need to know that I am currently able to 
identify the object in order to have a belief about it, as can demonstrated by the acceptability of 
(15).  
 (14). Abigail believes that my bike is her bike. 
(15). Abigail believes that it is hers, but of course, she does not know that it is currently a 
salient part of our conversation. 
 Something does not have an OLE when it is not a necessary condition for the third 
person’s belief because a listener understands it as the speaker’s way of referring to or denoting 
the state of affairs about which the third person has a belief. If I utter the sentence in (12), it is 
clear that the property attribution is being used to help the listener identify the object rather than 
being a part of Abigail’s belief. If something does have an OLE, putting the projection and its 
opposite under a belief predicate is just a contradiction. It in no way helps the listener identify 
the state of affairs about which the third person has a belief, so it is not interpreted as being used 
by the speaker to assist the listener. 
 In this paper, I have looked at some potential explanations for origin of the classes of 
projective content found in Tonhauser et al. (2013). The Strong Contextual Felicity Constraint 
concerns the acceptability of sentences in contexts that cannot be said to suggest the projection. I 
argued that this occurs because the SCFC deals with the identifiability of referents and that we 
are usually unwilling to accommodate that we ought to be able to identify something. The 
Obligatory Local Effect concerns the behavior of projections when sentences carrying these 
projections are the complements to belief predicates. I have argued that this arises due to the 
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